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Crime in
Shanghai 1927-1937 By Andrew
Moody Posted to Web Site: 10 May 2002 |
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“My current interests are
related to my studies at present, including two history courses - Modern
China: Economic and Social change during the Qing dynasty and the history of
Chinese in Southeast Asia. I am also doing
a Chinese pre-honours course covering a number of disciplines. “Thus I will pursue these areas
for each subject respectively: The relationship between Merchants and
Scholar-officials during the Qing period, with a case study on Hankou. “For my Southeast Asia course I
am likely to research something on the Chinese role in the development of
secret societies and the spread of vices, otherwise something on the
port-city structure; and in Chinese studies: “The implementation of post-1978
agricultural reforms: Top down or bottom-up?” “I hope to study in China after
completing my degree at UNSW.” |
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The availability of sources is
therefore limited by both language and location to those of a few authors,
notably Brian G. Martin and Frederic Wakeman, Jr. Therefore the bulk of this essay relies heavily on information
from only a few authors. But these authors and their texts, in my judgement,
have been widely researched and are worthwhile sources in their own right.” |
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In reality, however, it was a
city of opium, vice, and widespread organised crime. Because these criminal elements were not
limited by the concessional boundaries (and therefore effective policing),
their power was greater than either the foreign concession or the Chinese
authorities. Meanwhile, the Guomindang during
this period was progressing towards the establishment of a Nationalist
government. Due to its weak political
standing, it needed an ally to cement its power in Shanghai. Thus crime
became a part of politics in Nationalist-run Shanghai. This essay aims to demonstrate
the criminalisation of the Guomindang political structure by discussing
certain aspects of its rule between 1927 in 1937. Firstly, it looks at the
regulation of vice (gambling and prostitution) by the Nanjing regime and it
approaches to law and order. Secondly, it focuses on how
crime has functioned with politics, specifically the 1927 Communist purge,
the role of opium and attempts to regulate it. Lastly it examines how crime has
functioned in politics, especially following the events of 1932. |
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The maintenance of Law and Order
was an important issue for the Nationalist government; especially considering
Shanghai was not the centre of law and order in China, in fact, quite the
opposite. In 1927 the Nationalists
established a Chinese municipality to encompass all settled areas not part of
the foreign concessions, under the mayoralty of General Huang Fu. It promised to return law and order to the
city, otherwise it would remove the concessions’ extraterritoriality rights,
thus placing pressure on those councils and police to enforce the law. Furthermore, the government saw
Shanghai’s problems as a direct result of the foreign presence. The government also aimed to
make city residents feel more pride in their metropolis, especially following
the introduction of the “New Life” movement in 1934, by introducing wider
police powers giving officers the ability to interfere more in people’s lives
– a measure that proved quite unpopular. By trying to control Shanghai, the Guomindang only became more
unpopular among the city’s population. Gambling, a pastime for many in
Shanghai was one area that the nationalists found difficult to police and
regulate. It varied in scale and
scope and continued as such a highly liquid enterprise that its regulation
was almost impossible. For instance, in 1935 the
Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) force stated that around one million dollars
was raised from slot machines in the international concession alone and that
racing and casinos had a turnover above $1 million a week. Horse racing began as
entertainment for foreigners but proved to be very popular with the Chinese,
who by 1929 made up for 95 per cent of the Shanghai Race Club’s revenue. Greyhounds were even more popular since the
races were held more often.1 The Chinese Public Security
Bureau (PSB) had difficulty regulating gambling across settlement boundaries,
even though the SMP initiated several gambling crackdowns. Even so, the PSB appealed to the
Nationalist government to pressure the concessional authorities to further
control the gambling problem. A formal protest was made to the
British in 1929 about the greyhound tracks. As these protests were mostly
ignored, the government decreed, on 8th July 1930, that all greyhound racing
was to be banned, thus forcing its operators out of business. The International Concession
took heed, closing the tracks within its boundaries, but the French
authorities completely refused to comply, holding firm to their treaty
rights. The continuous trickle of
bribes from the gangster-run gambling operations also provided incentive to
the French to refuse to adhere to the ban. The campaign of gambling
regulation continued, however, until 1932, when it was whole-heatedly
abandoned.2 Prostitution, another of
Shanghai’s famous vices, was the leading occupation for women in Shanghai
during the 1920s and 1930s. It is
estimated that in 1920 one in three women in the French concession was a
street-worker. The International Settlement’s
by-law 34 gave the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) the right to license and
regulate brothels.3 Similar laws, however, were lacking in the Chinese-controlled
areas, where licensing was practised semi-officially. In 1928 Chiang Kai-shek
banned all prostitution in the provinces of Anhui, Jiangsu and Zhejiang,
increasing the number of prostitutes in Shanghai. Although opposed to
prostitution, the police, council and government did not stop licensing
brothels since it implied that the majority of sex-workers remained off the
streets. It also provided a source of revenue for the government.4 The Nanjing
regime was considerably anti-prostitution in its attitude, but it lacked the
will and the authority to do much about it, never affecting it in any
considerable way. An important theme emerges from
the above discussion of Nationalist attempts to regulate Shanghai’s vice
industries. One of the primary
problems the Chinese PSB and municipal authorities faced was regulation and
the control of crime across the boundaries of the foreign concessions. These boundaries were
effectively international borders. Therefore systematic regulatory objectives
were impossible to fulfil considering that gambling operators could shift
their operations over the boundaries. Likewise, to a certain extent,
brothel could do the same over a duration of months. Cooperation between the
different police forces was greatly lacking, mostly non-existent. Often it came
down to a particular officer dealing with a counterpart over the border, but
wholesale collaboration never occurred, except for one occasion in 1932. The arrival of the Japanese
forces in Zhabei in January of that year caused widespread anger and hatred
to the streets. On 18th September, 1932, one year after the Manchurian
Incident, the Citywide police forces worked together for the first (and last)
time to maintain order in the face of possible political and terrorist
actions.5 But petty crime was not the
major issue facing the Nationalist government – large-scale, citywide
organised crime and the trade of narcotics proved to be the government’s
undoing. |
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This relationship, often unstable and inconsistent, provided the
opportunity for the GMD to strengthen its position while tolerating the
gangster drug trade, and for the Green Gang to increase its business operations
in return for help against the communists. The Green Gang originated in the
early 17th century in the Yangtze basin as a secret society, as the “Anqing
Daoyou”. In the 1920s, two of the
sect’s most important figures, Zhang Renkui and Gan Shikui, transferred their
own sections to Shanghai. The gang began making profits
from salt-smuggling operations, which required the cooperation of corrupt
officials, an experience that later provided the means for opium smuggling. The Green Gang was loosely controlled and
organised but well structured. Competing for space between other gangs and
triads as well as amongst itself, by 1926, the Green Gang based in the French
Concession had emerged as the strongest and most powerful crime syndicate in
Shanghai. Under the leadership of
Huang Jinrong, Zhang Xiaolin and the fledgling Du Yuesheng, the FC Green Gang
was a force to be reckoned with.6 Political relations between the
Green Gang and the GMD had begun early. By 1927, Chiang Kai-Shek had already
made contact with Du Yuesheng. The Green Gang had operations in labour groups
and organisations, competing against, and working with, the communists prior
to the April 1927 coup.7 Chiang, already leading the
Northern Expedition, needed the financial support of the Shanghai business
community but found that the heavy presence of communists and trade unionists
challenged the ascendancy of the GMD.
It took four months for the Guomindang to acquire the assistance and
agreement of the Green Gang in its backlash against the communists. In July 1926 Niu Yongjian, a GMD
operative and Shanghai native, was sent by Chiang back to Shanghai to subvert
warlord military units and the CCP, as well as form financial and political
contacts with sympathisers. Meanwhile, a growing desire for Autonomy for Shanghai from the
destructive civil war led to the formation of the Shanghai Citizens’
Federation, with members from both the GMD and the Green Gang. With Niu’s assistance, this
mutual contact brought about a meeting between Chiang and Huang Jinrong in
Jiujang, during November 1926, where Chiang solicited the Green Gang’s
support in return for an opium monopoly.8 On 11th April 1927, the GMD and
Green Gang moved against the communists. Du was himself involved in the assassination of Wang Shouhua, a
CCP leader and trade union organiser. That night, and in the following
days, GMD troops and gang members, totalling 15 000 men, led a campaign of
terror and violence against the CCP and the trade unions. This concerted action resulted in over 5000
deaths, mostly executions. The FC Green Gang was also able
to use its wider network to remove all communist presence from Shanghai, much
to the satisfaction of Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang.9 With the Guomindang in power in
Nanjing, the Green Gang could pursue wider opportunities in the opium trade.
However, periods of cooperation and acceptance on the Guomindang’s behalf
alternated with periods of conflict and tension. The GMD viewed opium as a
prospect for much needed revenue raising through its regulation. Under the
banner of suppression, the Nationalist government could control the narcotics
trade. In 1927, following the coup, the National Opium Suppression Board
(NOSB) was established under Song Ziwen’s Ministry of Finance, as a means for
a monopoly. The Xin Yuan Company ran this
monopoly under NOSB direction. Initial support from the Green Gang bosses was
later withdrawn as the Xin Yuan monopoly undermined their own “Three
Prosperities” company. The resulting retail price war
between the two companies brought prices down and flooded the market with
opium. The Nationalists lost this
small battle against the experienced drug barons, and were forced to dissolve
the NOSB and awarded the opium contract to the Three Prosperities Company. In a last ditch effort to regain
control of the opium trade the Nationalists in August 1928 established the
National Opium Suppression Committee, which banned the use and trade of opium
altogether – it lasted two weeks, and the Green Gang retained its monopoly,
in different forms, until 1937.10 The role of opium and the events
leading up to, during and following the April 1927 purge demonstrates the
level of involvement the Green Gang had with the
Guomindang party and state. I do not
say in, for that comes later. During this early period of
Guomindang rule, when its authority was still weak, it turned to other
sources of power. The GMD
war-machine, with its intentions to govern all of China, was not strong
enough to do so in its own right. They needed the communists to
generate support and when they had outstayed their welcome, they turned to
criminals. The Green Gang, on the
other hand, regarded the GMD as a useful ally that could increase its opium
trafficking abilities. Furthermore, the Guomindang
united with the Green Gang precisely because it considered it not a threat to
its political power. Thus the element
of mutual benefit, however unlikely the partnership, emerged as the major
factor in the GMD-Green Gang relationship prior to 1932. |
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In late January Japanese troops
occupied Zhabei, causing widespread panic among the city’s citizens. The authorities under directions from Paris
ejected the Green Gang, having gained much power in the French Concession,
where it was based. At the same time, the Guomindang
underwent a leadership challenge, forcing Chiang to temporarily resign, and
leading to an overhaul of the Guomindang structure and the introduction of
the corporatist system. It was during
these turbulent times that Du Yuesheng not only survived with his gang intact
but also managed to consolidate his power and influence in his new base in
the Chinese City. His move, however, required the
support of the Nanjing regime. Of
course, it was negotiated in dollars. Du received official permission
to sell opium in the Shanghai area but at the cost of Ch$3 million a month to
MOF.11 Thus began the process of
legitimisation for the Green Gang’s opium operations. While this amount was
not unaffordable, it certainly affected Du’s profitability. He therefore had to find another means to
regain his control – he found it in politics as part of the elite: (Du
Yuesheng’s) purpose was to become part of the (Nationalist government’s
political) system. One of the most remarkable developments in the politics of
Shanghai in this period was a relative rapidity with which Du’s network of
personal power underwent a process of institutionalisation. By mid-1937 Du had become, in effect, an
integral part of the GMD’s corporatist system in Shanghai.12 Following 1932, Du participated
more widely in Shanghai’s Civic and administrative organisations and the
GMD’s labour control policies. His
tentacles of influence spread to almost all areas of Shanghai, in terms of
both geography and demography, from the elite to the workers. He even formed the “Endurance Club” – an
association for Shanghai’s Chinese elite, where they acknowledge Du as
leader, very much like his gangs. Du became influential without
being a legitimate businessman or becoming a politician, financing the
Nationalist government in so far as to retain his control over the opium
trade. In this respect, he was no
longer working closely with Zhang Xiaolin or his one-time benefactor, Huang
Jinrong. He was instrumental in the
creation of a covert, semi-official opium monopoly that was subject to the
occasional scandal. What might have been illegal for others was legal for Du
Yuesheng – because he had influence over the laws.13 Du was also director of the
Shanghai Opium Suppression Board: “Shanghai’s biggest narcotics dealer was at
the same time the city’s major civilian drug enforcement agent… an act of
stupendous government criminalization”.14 The regime was, from 1933,
legally selling opium to ‘licensed’ addicts as a source of revenue, while
other regional suppression boards sought to cut off illicit sources of
narcotics. Chiang’s suppression
boards even presented confiscated opium to Du Yuesheng to refine into
Morphine and Heroin, as the Chinese council, under Wu Tiecheng, pretended
nothing was happening.15 However, in 1934 a real attempt
at reducing opium consumption was commenced by the government as part of the
New Life Movement. The “Six Year Plan”
involved the systematic reduction of opium addiction by 1940. In the same year opium revenues
had netted the government $100 million, so a real reduction would be
detrimental to the government coffers. The plan was so evidently threatening to Du that he arranged to
have the plan’s architect, the Minister of Finance, Song Ziwen, assassinated
at the North Station.16 Song survived – but, feeling the
heat, the plan was scrapped, demonstrating the immense power Du held with the
threat of violence. Thus crime came to be part of
the political process. As politics
became interwoven crime, and vice versa, Nationalist ruled Shanghai moved
further and further away from the law and order that was originally stated in
its policies. Before the Japanese
arrived in 1937, Shanghai was not far from (or maybe it was already) having
criminals as politicians and politicians as criminals. |
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The period demonstrates that
crime is so perilous it can corrupt a government until it becomes an element
in crime or crime becomes part of the government. This critical examination of this theme has considered the role
of vices, such as gambling and prostitution, organised crime and the
overwhelming importance of narcotics trafficking in the Guomindang political
framework. The active participation of the
government in criminal affairs only spawned further and more deeply rooted
problems. When politics functions and
co-exists alongside crime, it is inevitable that it will eventually get into
crime, and develop inside the criminal element. A few in government benefit, as
do the criminal fraternity, but the social costs are huge. It took the communists many years to clean
up the mess that was Shanghai. Even
now in China crime, corruption and drugs have again started to rear its ugly
head – it is a problem that cannot be eradicated, only controlled. |
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Barbara Baker (ed), Shanghai: Electric and Lurid City, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1998. Nicholas R. Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the
Chinese Revolution of the 1920s, University
Press of New England, London, 1991. Stella Dong, Shanghai: The Rise and Fall of a Decadent City, Perennial,
New York, 2000. Gail Hershatter, Dangerous Pleasures: Prostitution and Modernity in
Twentieth-Century Shanghai, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995. Brian G. Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime,
1919-1937, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996. Brian G. Martin, "The Pact with the Devil: The
relationship between the Green Gang and the French Concession Authorities
1925-35”, Papers on Far Eastern History,
No. 39, pp 93-125, March 1989. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Policing Shanghai 1927-1937, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1995. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “Licensing Leisure: The Chinese
Nationalists' Attempt to Regulate Shanghai, 1927-49”, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 54, No.1, pp 19-42,
February 1995. Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and
Richard Louis Edmonds (eds), Reappraising Republican
China, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000. Bernard Wasserstein, “Secrets of Old Shanghai”, The Times Literary Supplement, London, 1-7 April, 1988. |
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4. Ibid, p 29 and
Gail Hershatter, Dangerous Pleasures:
Prostitution and Modernity in Twentieth-Century Shanghai, University
of California Press, Berkeley, 1995, pp 209 and 287. 5. Frederic Wakeman, Jr.,Licensing Leisure, p 31. 6. Brian G. Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and
Organized Crime, 1919-1937 University
of California Press, Berkeley, 1996, pp 17-31. 7. Nicholas R. Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the
Chinese Revolution of the 1920s, University Press of New England, London,
1991, p 251. 8. Brian G. Martin, The
Shanghai Green Gang, pp 87-89. 9. Ibid, pp 89-112 and Clifford p 253. 14. Frederic
Wakeman, Jr., Policing Shanghai 1927-1937,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995, p 259. 15. Iibid, p 264. See these pages for an amusing story on
how Du Yuesheng, along with Wu Tiecheng, tried to swindle the Nationalists by
processing higher quality heroin from elsewhere that he wasn’t required to
pay costs on. |
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