The Australia-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry of New South Wales |
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AUSTRALIA’S
TRADE AND AID POLICIES WITH CHINA 24
November 2000 Morning Session:
Australia’s Trade Policy with China |
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This
summary is intended to convey the main thoughts, ideas and suggestions that
emerged from the discussion. Although
attribution to specific individuals is possible, it would be complicated since
most of the thoughts and ideas that are reported here arose through from
comments by several people. It is
nevertheless important to note separate comments from the public sector
participants and the private sector participants. This separation is relevant to much of what is contained in the
summary. |
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Introductory comments by the
chairperson were linked to the briefing notes that were supplied prior to the
roundtable discussion. These were
intended as a “spring board” for the main discussion. The discussion began with a
restatement of paragraph 4 of In the National
Interest, which is a recent publication from the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (DFAT).
Specifically, Australia’s trade policy consists of three approaches:
multilateral efforts, regional efforts and bilateral efforts. These are deployed in an integrated and
mutually supportive way. Moreover,
“the greater part of Australia’s international efforts is, however,
bilateral, and bilateral relationships are the basic building block for
effective regional and global strategies’”. While the emphasis on
integration and mutual support is both relevant and important, it was not
clear how this can be achieved.
Specifically, integrating multilateral objectives associated with WTO
initiatives, for example, with either of the other efforts would seem to
dictate a similar (and perhaps identical) agenda for all three
approaches. Thus, in terms of the
overall objective (or guiding principle), only one approach would exist with
several slightly different courses of action available for the
implementation of the policy. Some confusion also existed in
relation to a specific choice for a course of action. For example, at the latest round of APEC
meetings in Brunei, it was announced after the ministerial meeting that
bilateral negotiations were under way for the possible enlargement of the
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) Agreement to include
Singapore. Several days later, after
the leader’s meeting of APEC, agreement was reached for a commitment to new
round of multilateral trade negotiations.
While more than one course of action could be followed at the same
time, doing so creates uncertainty as to how the choices are made and which
is the focus of attention at any given time. The public sector participants
commented on the APEC outcomes, indicating that the possible enlargement of
CER had been discussed for some time and a new round of multilateral trade negotiations
was on the WTO agenda last year, but agreement was not reached for various
reasons, including the public demonstrations in Seattle. Considerable discussion
followed, with the following points emerging: Ø
The most fundamental (and perhaps simplest)
component of Australia’s trade policy is the objective of increasing exports
in a way that is consistent with the policy of Australia’s trading partners. Ø
The principle role of DFAT in this objective is to
seek ways of reducing trade barriers.
This includes both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods
and services. Ø
A rules-based multilateral trading regime is
considered to be the most effective approach for Australia in achieving the
objective of trade liberalisation.
Not only does it allow negotiated outcomes to be shared by all
signatories to the regime, it is also more conducive to a multi-sector
approach (more on this below), which generally involves a number of
government departments in addition to DFAT. Ø
Such a multilateral trading regime requires support
through voluntary commitments of member countries under a mutually supportive
regime (such as the APEC) and close country-to-country contact in bilateral
trading relations. The impact of this on the
question of relative proportions of public sector resources devoted to
multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism is that flexibility is needed
in those proportions in order to adjust to rapidly changing
circumstances. Perhaps more importantly,
a shift in the relative proportions does not imply that Australia’s policy
(in terms of guiding principles, plans and courses of action) has changed. The participants generally
accepted this statement and various elements of the dot points mentioned
above were discussed. |
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The aspect of the WTO and that
is particularly important to Australia is the capacity for negotiations on
trade liberalisation to proceed simultaneously on a multi-nation and
multi-sector basis. A relaxation of
trade barriers on agriculture, for example, may require that the proponents
of a more liberal agricultural trading system agree to trade concessions in
other sectors, such as services or intellectual property rights. The binding nature of the WTO
agreements gives some assurance that negotiated arrangements, generally with
an assortment of concessions, will be adhered to after the agreement is
reached. Without this, the
often-protracted negotiations may not be taken seriously and the entire
process may appear uncertain and questionable. The dispute resolution procedure
of WTO is an integral part of the binding nature of the WTO agreements but is
not a major justification for the agreements, which is, put simply, to reduce
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. |
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APEC relies mainly on voluntary
commitments in trade liberalisation and these provide potentially valuable
inputs into the multilateral system of binding commitments. They not only help to identify structural
elements within the individual economies that may make it difficult to enter
into more extensive binding agreements, they also provide an environment for
co-operation and coordination in reducing or eliminating the restricting
structural elements. This is more
easily accomplished with interactions among sub-sets of trading nations. |
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Direct government-to-government
contact among members of the WTO or of regional trade groupings assists in
identifying potential constraints to further liberalisation and, when accumulated
across all bilateral discussions, often sets the agenda for regional and
global negotiations. Bilateral
discussions are also of vital importance in resolving disagreements over
trade and trading conditions before they require the use of an adversarial-based
dispute-resolution procedure. These
discussions can also pick up trade issues that are not part of regional or
multilateral agendas. |
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Ways of overcoming the failure
to achieve agreement for new multilateral negotiations at the Seattle meeting
of the WTO was a major focus of the Australian Government for much of this
year. Government participants pointed
to various documents that showed substantial macroeconomic advantages of
increased trade liberalisation for both developed and developing countries. It was generally agreed that
opposition to further trade liberalisation, and to the globalisation process
generally, has arisen from an unlikely coalition of various, otherwise
disconnected interest groups. As with
many such coalitions, it is uncertain whether it will prove to be stable and
durable. Private sector participants
in the roundtable discussion nevertheless suggested that even if the existing
coalition becomes unstable, it does not necessarily follow It was specifically suggested
that those who are opposed to further trade liberalisation are not persuaded
by the macroeconomic benefits of freer trade. Rather, they are concerned about the micro effects of the liberalisation
process. Perhaps more importantly,
continued emphasis on the macro benefits may become counterproductive by
highlighting benefits that are perceived to be unavailable to the
opponents. Greater benefits therefore
create (or are perceived to create) greater disparities. |
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Public sector participants
indicated that the main function of government was to establish a framework
for a more competitive domestic economy and not to exert undue influence on a
market-based distribution of trading benefits. Private sector participants
suggested that an economy cannot become fully and effectively competitive
unless information is made available to all market participants. In the case of information arising from
the government, this is not likely to occur unless the relevant government
departments make an effort to achieve it.
It is not sufficient to pass on information to selected individuals
and expect that it will become widely distributed. The constraints are: Ø
Smaller enterprises lack the resources to maintain
extensive information networks and therefore suffer a disadvantage in
receiving relevant information either too late or not at all. Ø
Since getting the relevant information early is of
benefit to any private sector enterprise or individual receiving it, there is
a built-in disincentive for those enterprises or individuals to distribute it
widely. Stated differently, if
information is valuable, those who have it will attempt to preserve its
scarcity value. Public sector participants
agreed that public sector/private sector communications could be improved but
indicated that the public sector did not have sufficient resources to
undertake a comprehensive program to educate and inform every member of the business
community. For some time, the
practice of the Australian Government has been to convey information through
representative bodies to the greatest extent possible. For example, the Trade Policy
Advisory Committee represents a peak business forum for advice to the public
sector on matters relating to trade and investment. The Agricultural Trade Consultative Group represent a peak
forum for consultation and coordination for WTO negotiations on agriculture. In addition, regular industry
consultations are held with services and manufacturing industry
representatives. Depending on the
issue, consultations are held through peak councils, industry sector
associations and individual firms.
DFAT organised informal consultations in the lead-up to the Seattle
meeting of the WTO to discuss work on trade-related matters. Private sector participants
agreed that these consultations are of value to the private sector. The Chamber participated in one of the WTO
consultations and benefited from the discussion. The belief nevertheless remained that these consultations could
be improved with relatively little additional resource input. The Chamber agreed to collect and compile
suggestions for improvements in the consultation process in a separate
document. |
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It was also suggested that while
the outcome-orientation of the public sector is understandable in relation to
the work plans, progress evaluations and perhaps also for budget
considerations of specific work groups, it does not carry a similarly useful
purpose in communications with the private sector. Specifically, if the information process is initiated only when
outcomes are available, then the private sector is effectively precluded from
providing any input into the activity that generates those outcomes. Public sector participants
suggested that the importance of outcomes should not be dismissed. They arise at a fairly high governmental
level and community approval or disapproval of them will necessarily be
recognised at that level. In
addition, multiyear corporate plans, annual operating plans and annual
reports gives a strong indication of priority areas, together with progress
that is anticipated and outcomes that were achieved. These should provide ample opportunity for
private sector input. More dialogue and exchange of
information on this issue was believed to be desirable. |
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Since information streams that are
initiated by the various work groups in the public sector focus on their
individual outcomes, a wide variety of outcomes will be reported. If the private sector is given the task of
putting all of these individual outcomes together to form an overall picture,
then it should not be surprising that misinterpretations and misconceptions
occur. This, in turn, is likely to
lead to overly critical views of the outcomes and impede the process of
information exchange. This was considered to be partly
a problem of interagency co-ordination and interpretation of the policy
framework. Some of the discussion
focused on the current structure of the public sector, compared to previous
structures with several comments suggesting that the previous structure was
more effective. The public sector participants
expressed the opinion that interagency co-ordination is much better now than
it was before. |
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Input from the private sector in
matters relating to trade and investment policy has tended to be relatively
narrow, reflecting short-term goals of specific enterprises. There is, or seems to be, a general lack
of understanding of many of the broader trade issues and this creates a level
of involvement that is deficient in providing useful input to the public
sector on these broader areas. Private sector participants
agreed that corporate executives in Australia lack an appropriate “culture”
to focus on longer-term strategies in relation to trade and investment, as
compared to other trading nations.
Leadership in remedying this must come mainly from the private sector. |
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Discussion of this issue began
with the suggestion that micro adjustments (adjustments at the enterprise and
industry levels) will be needed in both Australia and China (especially in
China). An assessment of the overall
benefits from a more open trading regime will be of little value in the
adjustment process. It was suggested further that
these micro adjustments could be achieved with greater participation of
private sector organisations in contributing to institutional strengthening
and improved capacity of Chinese enterprises to manage the necessary
changes. Public sector participants
pointed out that considerable work in these areas is being done within APEC. Private sector participants
reported that they had difficulties in linking into this work. The information available from the APEC
Secretariat consists mainly of minutes of meetings, and there is a substantial
delay in posted that information on the Internet. Presumably, the minutes are not made available to the public
until each member country officially approves them. Detailed agendas are not
available to the public prior to the meetings and little is available about
the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), other than press
advisories/releases and a copy of the report sent by the Council to APEC
economic leaders prior to their annual meetings. Though the number of private sector
participants at the roundtable discussion was relatively small, none had ever
received information about agendas or minutes of ABAC meetings in
Australia. No links exist on the APEC
Internet site for an ABAC Internet site in Australia. A general perception was that if
the Chamber or one of its associated organisations developed suggestions for
institutional strengthening to improve the capacity of Chinese enterprises to
adjust to a more open trading environment, there is no easy way of conveying them
to either the Australian Government or to APEC. Sister city relations represent
a potentially effective platform for closer linkages between Australian and
Chinese enterprises and industry associations. They are nevertheless difficult to coordinate and participation
of organisations such as the Local Government and Shire Associations would
seem to be required. |
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Some dissatisfaction was
expressed by private sector participants in matters relating to information
and advice given to exporters, or potential exporters, in ways of accessing
China’s market. Public sector
participants commented that such matters should be discussed with Austrade or
with the various industry associations that participate in export promotion. While the division of
responsibility among various government departments was generally understood,
as was the cutback of government expenditure for trade promotion, a
considerable amount of frustration had accumulated over the past several
years as a result of those changes. A useful comment was made by Mr
Lin Kun, outgoing Head of the Economic and Commercial Office of the
Consul-General of the People’s Republic of China and guest of honour at the
roundtable discussion and banquet following it regarding the
under-representation of Australian products in China. The quality of many products is believed
to be substantially better than their share of the Chinese market. This suggests that promotion and marketing
are weak. The discussion of these matters
yielded no definite solutions, or suggestions for solutions, but it did
highlight the concern that is being felt about weaknesses in trade promotion. |
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1. Separate document making
suggestions and comments about improving the flow of information from the
public sector (and from APEC) to the private sector. This will concentrate on the contents of
the relevant Internet sites in stating what information could be supplied
with relatively little additional resources, as well as information currently
supplied that is perceived to be of little value. Public sector participants
indicated that they would be receptive to these suggestions as they recognise
that improvements could be made to electronic flows of information. 2. More detailed information
about the nature of enterprise and industry adjustments in both Australia and
China as a result of China’s entry into the WTO. This will include a compilation of studies and opinions about
the effects of China’s entry into the WTO. 3. Continue the dialogue with
relevant government agencies in Australia and in China in matters relating to
trade and investment policy with China. |
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